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K Y B E R N E T I K A - V O L U M E 19 (1983) , N U M B E R 
ON A GAME THEORETICAL MODEL 
OF COOPERATIVE MARKET 
MILAN MARES 
The general coalition-game concept is used for the modelling of cooperative situations in 
a market. Some connections between the market equilibrium and strong cooperative solution 
of a game are shown. A weaker form of market equilibrium is suggested and briefly investigated, 
and some possibilities of dynamical changes of the considered market are discussed. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
The presented paper is subjected to some problems concerning the mutual relations 
between a market model and certain type of coalition-games. This connection 
between markets and games was investigated and some interesting results were 
presented e.g. in [1], [8] or [10]. However, theie exists certain disproportion between 
the market model and the game theoretical tools. One of its sources is a different 
attitude to the cooperation in both, market and game theoretical, models. 
The cooperation in markets investigated e.g. in [ l ] or [8] is limited to the exchange 
of goods respecting giyen prices, and the optimization concerns the individual profit 
only. On the other hand, the cooperation in coalition-games is rather stronger. 
The connections between markets and coalition-games are investigated by means 
of the theory of coalition-games with side-payments (cf. [2], [7], [8], [9]). In those 
games, coalitions aim to maximize their common profit, and the final income is 
distributed among their members in accordance with their agreement. Moreover, 
the achievement of certain profit of an agent in a market depends on the willingness 
and ability of other agents to accept the suggested exchange of the profit. The profit, 
of a coalition in a coalition-game with side-payments is usually interpreted as a gua-
ranteed one, independent on the behaviour of other players. 
It could be useful to apply the game theoretical, coalitional model of cooperation 
also to the market models. An attempt to construct such model of cooperative 
market was presented in [6]. The existence of coalitions with common stock of goods 
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is assumed there. The common goods are exchanged, and the increased profit of the 
given coalition is distributed among its members. The application of the coalition-
games with side-payments in this model implied the necessary existence of a linear 
representative of transferable utility common for all agents. This assumption is rather 
strong and unrealistic for usual applications. 
This discrepancy can be removed if we apply another more general model of co-
operation represented here by general coalition-games. In the following sections, 
we briefly recall some basic notions of the general coalition-games theory introduced 
and investigated in [3] and [4]. The cooperative market model investigated in this 
paper is described in Section 2, and the connection between general coalition-games 
and markets is investigated in further sections. It is shown there that the properties 
of the general coalition-games allow to derive strong relations between game theore-
tical solution and market equilibrium. Moreover, there can be suggested a weaker 
modification of the cooperative market connected with a corresponding equilibrium, 
which is also investigated in this paper. The last section contains a model of certain 
type of dynamic evolution of the considered market, and its relations to the usual 
static one. 
1. GENERAL COALITION-GAMES 
The coalition-games concept represents a wide scale of specialized types of games 
with different forms of cooperation among players. The coalition-games applied 
to the market models in [ l ] and [8] and in other works of that type are the coalition-
games with side-payments (cf. [2], [7], [8], [9]). It was already mentioned in the 
preceding introductory section that the coalition-games with side-payments can 
cause some problems if they are applied to the cooperative marked models. 
The general coalition-games model was suggested in [3] and investigated also 
in some other papers (cf. [4], [5]). It repiesents an attempt to consider only the essen-
tia] features of cooperation in games. Their main properties, motivation of defini-
tions and relations to some other more sp2cial coalition-games are discussed in [3]. 
Here, we recall the main notions which will be used in the following sections. 
Let us consider a non-empty and finite set /, let us denote by R the set of all real 
numbers, and let us consider a mapping V from the class, 2' into the class of subsets 
of R' such that for any K e 2' the set V(K) a R1 fulfils the following conditions 
(1.1) V(K) is closed; 
(1-2) if x = (Xi)^eV(K), y=(yi)ieIeR', 
yt£x, for all ieK, then yeV(K); 
(1.3) v(K) + 9; 
(1.4) V(K) = R'oK = 0 . 
94 
Then the pair (/, V) is called a general coalition-game (or briefly a game), elements 
of the set 7 are players, sets K <= 7 are coalitions, and the mapping Vis a general 
characteristic function. Any real-valued vector x E R' is called an imputation, and 
each partition Jf of the set / into non-empty and disjoint coalitions is a coalition 
structure. 
VK c / then it is useful to define the set 
(1.5) V*(K) = {y = (yt)i£l : y e R' and there is no 
x = (xi)iel e V(K) such that x ; ^ yt 
for all ieK and Xj > ys for some j e K) = 
= {y = (Vihi e R1 :for all x e V(K) is either 
y\ > Xj for some ieK or yt = x ; for all ieK). 
The mapping V* from 2' into the class of subsets of R1 is called a superopUmum 
of the game (/, V). 
In order to simplify the notations used below we denote 
V(Jt) = n V(M), V*(Ji) = n V*(M), 
MeJl MeJi 
for any non-empty set of coalitions Jt cz 21, Jt #= 0. 
Remark 1. It is not difficult to verify that for any K e 27, K =(= 0, and any x e V(K) — 
— V*(K) there exists ye V(K) such that yt ^ x ; for all ieK where the inequality 
is strict for at least one i eK. If V*(K) is a closed subset of R1 then the imputation 
y can be found in V(K) n V*(K). 
The solution of a general coalition-game will contain some stable imputations, 
i.e. imputations undominable by any coalition and any achievable imputation. 
The domination concept is formulated by means of the superoptimum mapping. 
As the general coalition-games are not necessarily superadditive, it is useful to note 
not only the stable imputations but also the coalitions and coalition structures 
in which they can be achieved. 
An imputation x e R1 is strongly stable iff there exists a coalition structure / c 2 ' 
such that 
x e V(X) = n V(K) and x e n V*(K). 
KeX Kd 
A coalition structure JT is strongly stable iff theie exists a strongly stable imputa-
tion xeR1 such that x e V(X). 
Remark 2. It is obvious that a coalition structure Jf is strongly stable iff 
V(X) n ( n V*(K)) * 0 . 
The definition of the general coalition-games includes a lot of different types 
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of games. Some of them are superadditive, subadditive or additive. Such games are 
investigated in [4], and it is useful to mention here some ideas which are applicable 
to the solution of some market problems. 
A general coalition-game (/, V) is called superadditive iff for every paii of disjoint 
coalitions K, L c / , K n L = 0, is 
V(K nL)=> V(K) n V(L), 
it is called subadditive iff for every pair of disjoin coalitions K, L <= / , K n L = 0, is 
V*(K nL)=> V*(K) n V*(L), 
and it is called additive iff it is superadditive and subadditive. 
Lemma 1. If V(K n L) c V(K) n V(L) for all K, L e i , K n L = | , then the 
game (/, V) is subadditive. 
Proof. The statement was proved in [3], Lemma 13. • 
Theorem 1. A coalition structure Jf in a subadditive general coalition-game is 
strongly stable if and only if 
r(pr) n (n V*({i})) * 0 . 
iel 
Proof. The subadditivity definition implies for any coalition K <z I the inclusion 
V*(K) = n v*({i}), 
is I 
where {/} are one-player coalitions for i el. It means that 
n V*(K) = n v*({ij), . 
x = r isi 
and the statement is proved. • 
Corollary. The coalition structure formed by exactly all one-player coalitions 
in a subadditive game is always strongly stable. It means that in subadditive games 
always exist strongly stable imputations. 
Theorem 2. If the game (/, V) is additive then all coalition structures are strongly 
stable. 
Proof. The theorem was proved in [3], Theorem 8. • 
Theorem 3. If the game (/, V) is additive then the real-valued vector - = (zj)J€l 
for which 
V({i}) = {x = (xj)Je! : x, £ z j for all is I 
is the single strongly stable imputation in the game. 
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Proof. As for all iel is 
V({i}) - { x - ^ : x , g z ( } , 
y*m)-{y-(y,hr.yi'=zi], 
then ze V*({(}) for all iel, and z e V(j^) for the coalition structure J of exactly 
all one-player coalitions. It means that z is strongly stable as follows from Theorem 1, 
Let us suppose, now, that there exists x e R', x 4= z, such that x is strongly stable. 
It means that x e V*({i}) for all ;' e /, i.e. x{ ^ z ; for all i e I, and Xj > z} for some 
j el, as x 4= z, Let us consider a coalition K c I such that jeK, where Xj > z}. 
As z e V*(X), and x,- < z,, x ; ^ z, for all / e X, then A: # V(X) for any K cz 7 for 
which jeK. It means that x^V(J^~) for any coalition structure JC, and then x 
cannot be strongly stable. Hence, there is no strongly stable imputation but z in the 
considered game. • 
2. COOPERATIVE MARKET 
After introducing the game theoretical concepts, the market model can be pre-
sented in this section. 
Let us suppose that i is a finite and non-empty set of agents, and that there exist 
in kinds of goods. By R'l we denote the set of all real-valued m-dimensional vectors 
with non-negative components. Vectors from R'l denote the quantities of goods. 
Let us suppose that there exists a vector 
(2.1) « - ( « , ) « , C, -eR : , £ . - = ( # , « ? ? . . . . , « ' ) , 
describing the initial quantities of goods owned by agents at the beginning of the 
considered situation. If a e R'l and /? e R + then we write a > fi iff aJ 2i fiJ for all 
;' = 1, ..., m and a* > /?* for some ke{\, ..., m). Let there exist continuous and 
increasing mappings ut : R'+ -> R, i el, where 
(2.2) if riteR1, f, e /?" , 17, > f, /hew «,(•/,.) >«,(( ,-) , / e / . 
Then the mappings w; are called utility functions of agents. Let us suppose, finally, 
that p = (pj)j=i,...,„„ Pj e R, pi > 0, j = \, ..., m, is a real-valued vector of prices 
of the respective goods, and that the scalar product p . n for w e R'l has sense. Then 
the quintuple 
m = (I,R"l,(ii)ieI,(ui)ieI,p) 
is called a market. 
It is useful to define the following sets for any coalition of agents K cz I. 
(2.3) A(K) = {aK = (at)lsK : a, 6 R'l, £ a, < £ £;} , 
ieK isK 
(2.4) 0(K) = {fiK = (/?;);eK :IJieR'l,Yp-Pi^lLP- Q , 
97 
called the aggregation set and the budget set of the coalition K, respectively. The 
following statements hold for those sets. 
Lemma 2. The aggregation sets A(K) are non-empty, bounded, closed and convex 
for all K cz I, K + 0. 
Proof. The sets A(K) are non-empty, as follows from (2.3) immediately. As the 
vectors a,- for i e K are re-distributions of the initial quantities of goods £;, the sets 
A(K) are closed and bounded. Let us consider aK e A(K), jiK e A(K), A e R, 0 = A = 1. 
Then for 
yK = laK + (1 - A) p\-
A l « i + (1 - A)X/?i = A£ £, + (1 - k)1 Si = Z «,. 
ieK I E K ieK ieK I 'EK 
Hence, yK e A(K), and the convexity of A(X) is proved. D 
Lemma 3. The budget sets B(K) are non-empty, bounded, closed and convex 
for all coalitions K c / J + f). 
Proof. If K c 1, K + 0, and QK = (QUK then obviously cK e B(K) * 0. As 
Pj > 0 for all j = 1,.. . , m, the sets B(K) are necessarily bounded and (2.4) implies 
thet they are closed. Let aK e B(K), fiK e B(K), /.eR, 0 = A = 1 , yK = ).aK + 
+ (1 - A ) , V Then 
! / » • Ti = A£p . a; + (1 - A) Ip . p, = l^p.^ + 
ieK ieK ieK ieK 
+ (i-A)Xp-£i = !/>•£,•, 
and the convexity of the sets B(K) is proved. • 
If i] = ('?,);6/, nte R + , then the pair (;/, p) is called a state of the considered market 
in. The states of market represent the results of activities realized in the market, 
namely the exchange done under the existing prices, and other manipulations with 
goods. 
If ((/, p) is a state of market such that 
(2.5) r,eA(l), 
(2.6) f/,eB({i}) for all iel, 
(2.7) ufyi) = max {«,(/?,•) : /?, e ©({/})} jor a// iel, 
then it is called a general equilibrium of the considered market m. 
There exists a relation between market model introduced in this section and some 
general coalition-games. The relation is investigated in the following section. 
3. MARKET GAMES 
The mutual connections between markets and some types of coalition-games are 
investigated in the literature, e.g. in [ l ] and [8]. The types of games investigated 
there are the coalition-games with side-payments (cf. [2], [8], [9]). There exists 
a difference between the game theoretical model of cooperation and that one assumed 
in market. The general equilibrium is a set of individual achievements satisfying 
particular agents, and the cooperation is reduced to the exchange of goods. It is 
achievable only under the assumption of analogical exchange possibilities and 
suitable demans of all agents. On the other hand, the coalition-games with side-
payments represent higher degree of cooperation among players forming coalitions 
and maximizing the guaranteed profit of those coalitions. 
It can be useful to apply the game theoretical concept of cooperation also to the 
market models, and to consider coalitions of agents operating with common goods 
and maximizing the common profit. If this model of cooperation is applied, then the 
coalition-games with side-payments are not an adequate tool for its description. 
Namely, there appears a necessity to assume the existence of some representation 
of utility which should be transferable among players, linear and identical for all 
of them. This assumption is rather strong and not very realistic. 
The general coalition-games theory offers game theoretical tools which are more 
adequate to the cooperative market models. They are not limited by some assumptions 
typical of coalition-games with side-payments, and consequently, the transition 
of utility among agents can be considered without the strong assumption about its 
representative. 
In this section, a game theoretical analogy of the cooperative market based on the 
genera! coalition-games concept is suggested. 
Wishing to derive a game or more games representing the considered market, 
it is useful to introduce the following notations. If K c / and A(K), B(K) are the 
aggregation and budget sets by (2.3) and (2.4), respectively, then we denote 
(3.1) Va(K) = {x e R
[ : 3aK 6 A(K), Vi e K, xt ^ u{ai)} , 
(3.2) Vh(K) = { X E R ' : 3ftK e B(K), V/ e K, xt ^ u{ji)} . 
Theorem 4. The pairs (/, Va) and (/, Vh) are general coalition-games with general 
characteristic functions Va and Vb. 
Proof. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the sets A(K) and B(K) are closed in (R+)
K. 
If aK e A(K), jiK e B(K), and if 6>K e (R"l)
K, f>K e (R
m
+f, where 
&{ ^ %[, p\ g p\ for all i e K, j = 1, . . . , m , 
then also aK E A(K) and fiK e B(K), as follows from (2.3) and (2.4). As the utility 
functions u„ iel, are continuous and increasing, formulas (3.1) and (3.2) imply 
the validity of (IT), (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4) for Va and Vb. • 
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The games (/, Va) and (/, Vb) characterize the cooperation possibilities in the 
considered market m. 
Lemma 4. Foi every coalition K c / i s A(K) c B(K) and Va(K) c V^K). 
Proof. Both inclusions follow immediately from (2.3), (2.4) and (3.1), (3.2), 
respectively. • 
Lemma 5. If V* is the superoptimum in the game (/, Vb) then for every pair of dis-
joint coalitions K, L <=. 1, K n L = 0, is 
V*b(K u L) = V*(X) n V*(L) . 
Proof. Let yeR', yjt V*(K u L). Then j> £ V„(K u L) - V*(X u L) and there 
exists x e Vb(K u L) such that 
(3.3) x ; ^ _y; for all I G K U L , x ; > y; for some ieKuL. 
As x e V,,(K u L), there exists /?KuL e S(X u L) such that x ; £ w;(jS;) for all i e K u L, 
and 
(3-4) I # • ft _. I /> • «. • 
Then also 
! > . / ? . £ £ / > • ? , or £ * • & :£ 5 > • cj. • 
Let us suppose that the first one of the two inequalities is fulfilled, i.e. 
(3-5) (SK = (fh)isK e B(K). 
If x ; > yt for some i e K then j §§ V*(K), as x e Vb(K) by (3.4) and (3.5). If 
(3.6) Xi = y, for all ieK 
then there are two possibilities. Either 
Xj < Uj(Pj) for some j e K 
and then there exists ze R1 such that 
z e Vb(K), z, = u,(0t) for all ieK, 
z, > yj, Zj ^ )'j for all ieK . 
Hence, j £ V6*(X). Or 
x ; = u,(i3,) for all ieK. 
Then either 
(3.7) I / ' - f t <]&>•«. 
ieK ieK 
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(3.8) 2>./J i = I/>.f i. 
ieK ieK 
If (3.7) holds then there exists ^ e B(K) such that <5; > & for all i e K. Then the 
strict monotonicity of ut implies that there exists z = (z,),-e/ e Vfc(X) such that 
z ; = «;(<5;) > «,(/?,) = x, = >', 
for all / e X, and then y $ V*(/C). If (3.8) holds then necessarily 
2> • & < I> • f * 
fsl JeZ. 
as follows from (3.4). Then x e V6(L), and x ; > >; for some / e L, as follows from 
(3.3) and (3.6). Then y £ V*(L). It means that if y $ V*(K u L) then either j 4 V*(K) 
or y ^ V*(L), and the statement is proved. • 
Lemma 6. For any K, L c I, K n L = 0 is 
F„(K U L ) D Vfc(X) n Vft(L) . 
Proof. If .*: e F^K), y e Vb(L) then there exist P'K e B(X) and P] e B(L) such that 
Xi<Ui(P'i) for all / e / C , yi £ U01) for all / e L . 
Let us construct 
pKui = (PihK.L, & = # for all / e X , 
/?, = # ' for all / e L . 
Then 
!>./?,• = L/>-/3' + ІP-ß" ѓ ІP-ţi, 
and /?Kwi. e S(iC u L). An imputation z e R
1 such that 
z ; = x ; for all ieK, z ; = >'; for all / e L 
belongs to Vb(K u L), and the statement holds. • 
Theorem 5. General coalition-game (J, Vb) is additive. 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6. • 
Theorem 6. General coalition-game (I, Va) is superadditive. 
Proof. Let us consider K, L c 1, K n L = 0, and x e Va(K), y e Va(L). Then there 
exist <x'K e A(K), a'[ e A(L) such that 
x ; <; «,(a;) for all ieK , 
)'i :g ufa") for all i e L. 
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If aKwL — (ai)iEKvL> « ; 6 #+> a ; = a'i f° r aH ' e K, a; = aj for all / e L, then aKuL e 
G A(K u / ) , and an imputation z e R1, z; = xt for / eK, z; = yt for / e L, belongs 
to VX^uL). D 
Lemma 7. If iel, {/} e 2 ; is one-player coalition containing exactly /, and if 
y e R' then 
y 6 Vb({i}) n Vb({i})o v; = max {u0t) : /?, e B({/})} . 
Proof. If j e V„({/}), then y e V*({i}) if and only if y, § x, for all A: e V6({i}), i.e. 
if and only if 
y< = max {«,<&) :&e®({i})}> 
as follows from (2.4) and (3.2). ' D 
Theorem 7. Any state (rj, p) of the market m is a general equilibrium if and only 
if n e A(I) and for all / el is /?,- e B({i}) and (uk(fh))keI £ V*({/}). 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Lemma 7 and from the definition 
of general equilibrium. D 
Lemma 8. If (rj, p) is a general equilibrium and if z e Rl is the imputation for 
which z, = «,<>/,-) for all iel, then zeVb(K) n V*(K) for all K c I. 
Proof. By Theorem 7 and by the definition of general equilibrium is z e V*({i}) 
for all iel. The additivity of (I, Vb) implies that ze V^(K) for all K <= I. Lemma 7 
and the definition of general equilibrium imply that zeVb({i}) for all iel. As 
(/, Vb) is additive, - e V6(iC) for all X c /. D 
Theorem 8. If (ri, p) is a state of market m, and if ze R1 is the imputation for which 
z ; = «,•(/?,•) for all iel, then (if,p) is general equilibrium if and only if zeVa(l) 
and j is a strongly stable imputation in (/, Vb). 
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 8 and from the definition of general 
equilibrium immediately. D 
Theorem 9. If there exists a general equilibrium (?/, p) in a market m then for 
arbitrary coalition structure Jf is 
Vfl(/) n V*(X) 4= 0 . 
Proof. If (>l, p) is a general equilibrium and x = (x,),-e/ e R
1 is the imputation 
for which x ; = M;(̂ /;) for all Zel then the definition of general equilibrium and 
Lemma 8 imply 
x e Va(I) and .r e V*(K) for all K c / . • 
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Theorem 10. If (;y, p) is a general equilibrium in market m and if y e R1 is the im-
putation for which y-t = »;(f/;) for all i e 1 then y is strongly stable in general coalition-
game (I, Va). 
Proof. If (q,p) is a general equilibrium then, by Theorem 7. r\ e A(l) and for all 
yeVb({i})nVt({i}). 
It means that y e Va(l) and y e V*(K) for all coalitions K cz /, as follows from Lemma 
5. Moreover, by Lemma 4 is 
Vt(K) c ro*(K) 
for all K c /, as 
Va(K) u V*(K) = R' = V,(K) u F*(/C). 
Hence, y e Va(K) for all K c I, and the statement holds. • 
It was shown in this section that there exist strong relations between general 
coalition-games and the considered type of markets. Some of the results presented 
here are rather similar to those known from the literature, e.g. from [ l ] or [8]. It 
concerns especially the results on mutual relations between the strongly stable 
imputations in games and general equilibrium in markets. However, the analogy 
between markets and coalition-games with side-payments shown in the literature 
is not as strong as the one between markets and general coalition-games. For example, 
the general equilibrium implies the existence of core in a coalition-game with side-
payments (cf. [8]) but it need not be equivalent with it except of the asymptotic 
case (cf. [l]). It is also obvious from the comparison of this paper with the classical 
literature (cf. [ I ] , [8], [10]) that the proofs based on the genera! coalition-games 
are more simple and more lucid. 
The general coalition-games can be applied also for modelling some weaker 
solutions of cooperation in the considered markets in which the exiestence of general 
equilibrium is not guaranted. Such model is suggested in the next section. 
4. WEAK FORM OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
The general equilibrium concept described in Section 2 and investigated also 
in Section 3 represents a stable and commonly acceptable solution of the market 
cooperation. Nevertheless, it does not exist in many real markets, and it is useful 
to formulate some weaker analogy of equilibrium defining possible rational behaviour 
of agents if the general equilibrium is not achievable. 
A realistic way is to suppose stronger cooperation among agents who cannot 
reach the individualistic general equilibrium. We suppose that agents form coalitions 
in which they gather their goods together (form the aggregation sets), dispose with 
it in order to optimize the final set of goods, and then re-distribute the obtained 
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goods in certain sense proportionally to the input utility and to the preferences 
of the coalition members. This kind of cooperation cannot usually offer the maximal 
utility theoretically covered by their budget set, but it brings moie utility than the 
original distribution of goods. It is possible to show that such cooperating coalitions 
have chance to satisfy their requirements and to be realized if the general equilibrium 
does not exist. 
This model accents the importance of stronger cooperation aiming to the optimiza-
tion of common profit. Moreover, it presents a weaker solution reducible to the genet al 
equilibrium if it exists. 
The theoretical model assumed here allows to take arbitrary classes of coalitions 
into consideration. However, it is obvious that the typical classes of such realized 
coalitions should form coalition structures or their unions. 
Let us consider a class of coalitions J4 c 21, and a state (;/, p) of market m. Then 
(/?, p) is called an Jt'-equilibrium iff ^ e A(]) and for any K e Ji is 
>U = (li)ieK 6 B\ 
Remark 3. If Ji c Jr c 2' and if (>1, p) is an ./(/"-equilibrium then it is also an 
^-equilibrium. 
Remark 4. If Ji = ({/}),e7, i.e. Ji is the class of all one-agent coalitions, then 
the ^//-equilibrium is identical with the general equilibrium of the considered market, 
as follows from the definitions of .///-equilibrium and general equilibrium and 
from Theorem 7. 
Remark 5. If Ji c 2', Jf c 2' and if (»y, p) is an ^//-equilibrium and an ^ -equ i -
librium simultaneously then (;j, p) is also an (Ji u ./^-equilibrium as follows 
from the definition immediately. 
Theorem 11. Let Ji c JT c 2', let Lu ...,L„e Ji, L,- n L} = 0 for all ije 
e {1, ..., n), i 4= j , let L = Lx u ... u L„, and let Jf = Ji u {L}. Then any state 
of market (y\, p) is an ^//-equilibrium if and only if it is an ,/V-equilibrium. 
Proof. Let us suppose that {>i, p) is an ^-equilibrium. Then ^ e A.(l), ^K e B{K) 
for all K e Ji, and if x e R', xf = «,•(/;,) for all i e 1 then x e V*(K) for all K e Ji. 
Let us consider L , , . . . , Lk e Ji fulfilling the assumptions of this theorem, and L = 
= Lx u ... u L„. Then ^L = (?7,),eL e B{L) as follows from (2.4) immediately, and 
x e V*(L) as follows from Lemma 5. It means that (>7, p) is also an ./F-equilibriurn. 
The opposite implication follows from the definition (cf. Remark 3) immediately. Q 
Theorem 12. If (77, p) is a general equilibrium in the market m then (>i, p) is also 
an ^-equilibrium for any Ji c 2'. 
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Proof. Repetitive application of Theorem 11 implies that (*;, p) is an ^//-equi-
librium for any Ji c 2' containing all one-agent coalitions. It means by Remark 3 
that it is an ^-equilibrium for all Ji c 2'. Q 
Remark 6. Theorem 11 and Remark 3 imply analogously to Theorem 12 that 
if Jf is a coalition structure, Ji c 2 ' , / c Ji, and if there exists an .//-equilibrium 
then there exists an {/}-equilibrium where {/} is the class of coalitions containing 
exactly one coalition of all agents. 
Theorem 13. If Ji = {/} contains exactly the coalition of all agents then there 
exists an ^-equilibrium in the considered market if and only if Va(I) n V*(I) 4= 0-
Proof. If (?j, p) is a state of the market and x e R1, x; = «,('?,) for all i e 1 then 
(rj,p) is an {/}-equilibrium iff n e A(l) n B(l) and .veV*(/). As A(l) c B(I) by 
(2.3) and (2.4), (77, p) is an {/}-equilibrium iff x e Va(l) n V*(I), where (3.1) was used. 
Theorem 14. Let Ji c 2', (»j, p) be a state of market m, and let x e R', x ; = «,(*/,) 
for all 1 e J. If (/?, p) is an ^-equilibrium then A' e V*(K) for all K e .//. 
Proof. By definition of ^/-equilibrium, x e V*(K) for all K e Ji. As Va(K) c 
c Ffc(K) for all K c / and 
Fa(K) u V*(K) = R' = Ffc(X) u F*(/<). 
the statement holds. • 
5. DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET 
The market model investigated in the preceding sections was static, describing 
one isolated exchange process with fixed quantities of goods. Such situation can be 
considered also as a repetition of similar exchanges of goods realized by the same 
agents but with rather different structure of goods. The variability of the structure 
of goods can be caused by different initial distributions or by production and con-
sumption influencing the quantity of existing goods. 
It is possible to suppose that there exist certain general characteristics of the 
market which are preserved. The aim of this section is to study the existence of general 
equilibrium and ^-equilibrium in such changing market. 
Let us consider a market m = (/, R™, (< ;̂),-6/, («i),e/>p) satisfying the assumptions 
introduced in Section 2. Let us denote 
H = {ri = (t,i)leI:riieR
m
+}, 
and consider a transformation S of the set H into itself. For arbitrary ^ e H 
Sri = (Sri i)^, Sr,teR1. 
Then the transformation of market m into another one can be described as a trans-
105 
formation of the vector c, = (£,)tel into another vector of initial quantities of goods 
SQ = (S<;,),E/, where the set of agents keeps unchanged but utilities and prices can be 
generally changed. This type of transformations of the market is considered in this 
section. 
If the original market was denoted 
(5.1) m=( / ,R ' : , (C ; ) ; E „(« ; ) , e „p ; 
then the transformed market is 
(5-2) - " - ( U l . f S ^ W u , ! ) , 
and for all coalitions K c l w e have 
S A(K) = {aK = (a , ) w : a, e R
m
+, £ a; g I S£.} , 
isK IEK 
S s(x) = {fe = G8.)« : /J, eR+,Z9-Pi^Zq- SQ . 
ieK ieK 
Symbols SVa(K) and SFj,(X) for K c I denote the sets of imputations derived 
from SA(K) and SB(K) analogously to formulas (3.1) and (3.2), 
SVa(K) = {x eR' :3aKeS A(K), VieX, x, g y,(a,)} , 
SVh(K) = {x G R' : 3pK e S B(K), Vi 6 K, x, g u^ , )} . 
Then the pairs (I, SVa) and (/, SV,) are general coalition-games as follows from 
Theorem 4. 
Here we consider transformations of markets preserving some basic characteristics 
of the market structure. 
We say that the transformation S of market tn into market Sm preserves quanti-
ties iff for any y e H, d e H 
I r i - - I * i o I S y i - - E ^ « -
iel iel iel iel 
We say that S preserves price relations iff for any y e H, 5 e H the following 
relation holds 
P • li ^ /><5; <*• q • Syt 2£ g . S<5; for all i e / . 
Similarly we say that S preserves utility relations iff for any y e H, 8 e H 
ufy)) ^ u,{3t) o vt(Syt) £ v£SSt) for all i e l . 
Lemma 9. If the transformation S preserves quantities then for any ae H 
a e A(I) oSaeS A(l). 
Proof. If S preserves quantities then 
I a,- ^ I ?t <=> I Sa; g I SZt . D 
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Lemma 10. If S preserves price relations then for any J ( c l and any ft e H 
P e B(K) oSfieS B(K). 
Proof. If S preserves price relations then for any K c J 
yp.lil^Y.p.cioTq.Spi^Y.9-^i. D 
r'sK feK ieK ieK 
Theorem 15. Let the transformation S of market m into market Sm preserve quan-
tities, price relations and utility relations, and let (/y, p) and (S/7, q) be states of markets 
m and Sm, respectively. Then (^, p) is a general equlibrium in m if and only if (S^. q) 
is a general equilibrium in Sm. 
Proof. Lemma 9 implies that ij e A(I) iff Si-j e S A(l) and by Lemma 10 is i] e 
e B({i}) iff SrjeSB({i}) for all iel. If S preserves utility relations then, using 
Lemma 10, 
Ui(r,i) = max {«,.(/?,.) : ft e ©({/})} 
iff 
Vi(Sr,i) = max {»,(&) : f t e S B({/})} 
for all iel. D 
Theorem 16. Let the transformation S of market m into market Sm preserve 
quantities, price relations and utility relations, let (77, p) and (S;7, q) be states of 
markets m and Sm, respectively, and let J( <= 2' be a class of coalitions. Then (>i, p) 
is an ^//-equilibrium in m if and only if (S/7, q) is an .//-equilibrium in Sm. 
Proof. Lemma 9 and 10 imply that ^ e A(I) iff Sij e S A(l) and for any K a I 
is n e B(K) iff S^ e S B(K). For a n y K c / 
(ui(«i))iSIeVt(K) 
iff there does not exist ye Vb(K) such that >•,• 2: «.(>;.) for all / e K and v, > "/»?,) 
for some 7 e K. It is true iff there does not exist ft< = (ft),sK e B(X) such that 
U,(Pi) ^ w,(^,) for all ieK , 
UJ(PJ) > Uj(t]i) for some j eK . 
If S preserves utility relations, the preceding condition is fulfilled iff there does not 
exist any yK = (yt)ieK e
 s B(K)sucl1 t n a t 
p,.(y() ^ i>;(S;/,.) for all / e K , 
vfyj) > Vj(Si]j) for some j e K . 
But this is true iff 
(vt{S,h%ieSVt(K). D 
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Theorem 17. Let the transformation S of market m into market Sm preserve price 
relations and utility relations. Then there exists a strongly stable imputation in the 
game (/, Vb) if and only if there exists a strongly stable imputation in the game 
(/, SVb), and a coalition structure Jf is strongly stable in (I, Vb) if and only if it is 
strongly stable in (/, SV„). 
Proof. Let us suppose that there exists a strongly stable imputation x = (x,),6/ e R
1 
in (/, Vb). It means that there exists a coalition structure C/C such that x e Vb(jf), 
and x e V*(L) for all L <= I. As x e Vb(jf) and x e V*(jf), there exists ftK = (/?,-)feK e 
e B(K) for any KeJf, such that A; = »,(/?,) for all ieK. If this statement is not 
true for some KeC%~, then there certainly exists (]KeB(K) for which x ; ^ «,(/?,) 
for all i e K and x, < Uj(fi^) for some j e K. But the vector y e R1 such that yt = 
= Uj(Pj) for all ieK also belongs to Vb(K). Then we obtain the relation x$ V*(K) 
contradicting the assumption of strong stability of x. Hence, for any K e J T there 
exists a vector fiK e B(K) such that x ; = «,•(/?,•) for all i e K. Let us denote ft = (/i,)fef, 
where /?,- are components of vectors flk for respective disjoint coalitions from Jf". 
If Sfi = (SPi)iei is the transformation of [i then we denote 
Sx = (SXi)iEleR', 
the imputation for which 
Sx, = ojSPt) for all iel. 
Lemma 10 implies that Sp e SB(K) for all KeJf, and then SxeSVb for all K e Jf. 
We know that x e V*(L) for all L e i , Let us suppose that Sx $ SF*(L) for some 
L c /, where the set of imputations SVb(L) is derived from SVb(L) by means of (1.5). 
Then there exists y e SVb(L) such that 
)>i ^ Sx; for all i e L, 
yj > Sxj for some j e L. 
As ye S Vb(L), there necessarily exists y e B(L) and § = Sy e S B(L) such that 
Vi(8i) = yt for all ie L. By Lemma 10 
Vi(8i) ^ i;;(S/3;) for all i e L, 
Vj(dj) > VJ(SPJ) for some j e L, 
iff 
M;(y;) ^ w;Q?;) = xi for all i e L , 
UX^') > UJ(PJ) = x j f ° r s o m e ie I • 
This contradicts the assumption of strong stability of x in the game (/, Vb), namely 
the relation x e V*(L) for all L<= I. It means that the imputations x and Sx are 
strongly stable in (I, Vb) and (/, S Vb), respectively. Moreover, the coalition structure 
J f is strongly stable in both games. • 
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6. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
It has been shown in the foregoing sections that the concept of general coalition-
games is suitable fot modelling certain type of markets and their equilibria. They aie 
adequate to some specific market properties, especially to different forms of super-
additivity subadditivity and additivity. Further, they can be used for modelling 
some modified forms of equilibrium, the ^-equilibrium, representing an advanced 
degree of cooperation in the considered market. This application of general coalition-
games is possible without strong assumptions about transferability of profit which 
are necessary if some other game models are used for similar purpose. 
There has been also suggested a method of modelling the dynamics of market 
including potential development of more components like initial distiibutions 
of goods, utility functions and prices. There were formulated sufficient conditions 
under which the solutions of market and corresponding market games can be preser-
ved during the market transformation. It seems that some further results concerning 
the parallel development of market and market games can be derived by using the 
game theoretical tools in future. 
(Received June 10, 1982.) 
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